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and what they are capable of producing.
This Commentary presents the general
economic case for freer trade and high-
lights some of the costs of resisting it. 
■ The Economic Case for
Freer Trade
The idea of comparative advantage is
what drives arguments for free and open
trade. When countries specialize in
goods or services for which they have a
comparative advantage and trade with
others for goods in which they have a
comparative advantage, both sets of
goods can be produced less expensively.
If Canada grows softwood lumber and
leaves the banana growing to Honduras,
bananas and softwood lumber will be
less costly for all.
Although trade allows both parties to be
made better off, it also means the mix of
goods produced within a country will
probably change. So, although the coun-
try as a whole benefits, some producers
will suffer losses as a result. However,
the gains a country realizes from trade
can be redistributed to those who have
been made worse off. 
The concept of comparative advantage is
probably best understood through an
example. Say Lisa runs a fish-and-chips
stand. It takes her 4 minutes to prepare
an order of chips and 8 minutes to pre-
pare an order of fish. In an 8-hour day,
Lisa could produce either 120 orders of
chips (and no orders of fish) or 60 orders
of fish (and no orders of chips), or a
combination of the two. It turns out that
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When U.S. steel corporations began
declaring bankruptcy and laying 
off thousands of workers, tariffs on
foreign steel seemed a reasonable way
of preventing further damage to the
industry. But why do most economists
favor free trade?
International trade is a topic that elicits
loud and, all too often, violent reaction.
The debates surrounding practices to
make imported goods more expensive
(tariffs) or to make exported goods
cheaper (subsidies) do not arise solely
between trading partners. For example,
there is now lively debate within the
United States about whether such poli-
cies should be implemented. Demon-
strators typically protest meetings of 
the World Trade Organization, claiming
that free trade engenders pollution and
child labor.
Amidst such controversy, it may seem
curious that most economists favor free
and open trade. Their argument rests
mainly on the concepts of specialization
and comparative advantage. The essence
of the argument is that countries (or
individuals) should specialize in those
tasks in which they are relatively more
efficient. Economic theory then says that
the gains from trade are widespread,
helping each trading partner by lowering
the price of goods and possibly provid-
ing a greater variety of them.
In such an idyllic world, who should
complain? Well, in practice, things are
not so cut-and-dried. In addition to
issues of pollution and child labor, free
trade raises concerns about dislocated
workers in affected industries. If com-
puter chips are now manufactured in
another country—because they can do it
less expensively than we can—what
happens to those domestic workers now
displaced with foreign ones? 
Over the past year or so, it may seem
that the United States has behaved errat-
ically on the matter of free trade. In his
first year in office, President Bush pro-
moted a free trade agenda. He lobbied
Congress for Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA), also known as “fast track author-
ity,” so that he could implement new
trade agreements quickly. In essence,
TPA means that Congress agrees to hold
an up-or-down vote on trade treaties.
One proposed agreement that Bush sup-
ports is the Free Trade Area of the Amer-
icas (FTAA), which would expand
NAFTA to Central and South America.
The Bush administration also supported
the Doha Development Agenda, which
seeks to help developing countries
through trade. The administration was
also instrumental in China’s and Tai-
wan’s admission to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 
More recently, the Bush administration
has taken actions that appear to contra-
dict its free trade stance. On March 5,
the United States imposed tariffs of up to
30 percent on a variety of steel products
imported principally from Europe,
Japan, and Russia. NAFTA partners
Canada and Mexico were exempt from
these tariffs, as were developing coun-
tries. Days later, the U.S. Commerce
Department accused Canada (in a pre-
liminary finding) of subsidizing its soft-
wood lumber industry and “dumping” its
lumber on the U.S. market. As a result,
on May 22 the United States imposed
tariffs totaling 29 percent on Canadian
softwood lumber imports. There is also
speculation that the United States may
levy tariffs on textile imports, which
would primarily affect a number of
developing countries. 
When barriers to free trade are erected,
countries typically lose overall. Tariffs
and subsidies can spark countermeasures
that are nearly as detrimental to the
country imposing them as to the pun-
ished party. More importantly, free trade
generates substantial economic gains for
all participating countries—gains that
are greater than the costs and can, if so
allocated, be used to offset the costs.
Workers may have to switch occupa-
tions, but so they must when technical
innovations or shifting consumer prefer-
ences force changes in what people wantLisa’s customers always order fish and
chips together. So, Lisa produces and
sells 40 orders of fish and chips each day.
Bart also runs a fish-and-chips stand.
Unfortunately for Bart, he is much less
productive than Lisa; it takes him 48
minutes to make an order of chips and
12 minutes to produce an order of fish.
Consequently, in an 8-hour day, Bart
can produce either 10 orders of chips
(and no orders of fish) or 40 orders of
fish (and no orders of chips). Bart’s cus-
tomers also prefer to have their fish and
chips together, so he sells 8 orders of
fish and chips each day.
Notice that Lisa is uniformly more pro-
ductive than Bart: It takes her less time
to make either an order of fish or an
order of chips. Economists would say
that Lisa has an absolute advantage in
the production of both fish and chips.
However, Bart has a relative or compar-
ative advantage in producing fish
orders. To make an order of fish, Bart
gives up 1/4 order of chips. Lisa, on the
other hand, gives up 2 orders of chips to
produce an order of fish. This is the
basis on which Bart and Lisa may,
potentially, find gains from trade.
Suppose that Bart and Lisa consolidated
their operations, with Bart producing
only orders of fish (the activity at which
he has a comparative advantage). Col-
lectively, Bart and Lisa would sell 66
orders of fish and chips, with Bart
spending his entire day making 40
orders of fish while Lisa divided her
time between producing the 40 orders of
chips to go along with Bart’s produc-
tion, and 26 orders of fish and chips on
her own. So, collectively Bart and Lisa
can sell more orders of fish and chips
(66) than if they operate separately (48).
In fact, if Lisa could find two more peo-
ple like Bart, she could specialize
entirely in the production of chips while
her partners specialize in the production
of fish. On their own, these fish-and-
chips vendors would sell 64 orders, but
collectively they would sell 120 orders.
To see the effects of a tariff, suppose the
government imposes a tariff of 33-1/3
percent on sales of fish orders by Bart to
Lisa. This implies that when Lisa “buys”
3 orders of fish from Bart, she must give
the government 1 order (to pay the tariff).
If Bart continues to produce 40 orders of
fish, then Lisa receives 30 orders (net of
the tariff). Lisa will then spend 120 min-
utes producing the 30 orders of chips to
go along with Bart’s orders of fish, then
spend the rest of her time making 30
orders of fish and chips, for a total of 60
orders. While these 60 orders are obvi-
ously more than the 48 that Bart and Lisa
would produce individually, they are less
than the 66 orders that Bart and Lisa could
produce if there was no tariff. In this way,
tariffs retard overall economic activity.
What about the tariff revenues raised by
the government? This example is a little
too stylized to treat these revenues seri-
ously, so let’s suppose these revenues are
simply dropped into a deep hole in the
earth. But even if the government simply
gave away the fish to its citizens, it would
be of little value because people only like
to consume an order of fish when it
comes with an order of chips. The point
is that tariffs introduce a distortion that
leads to losses to society as a whole.
So, in the above example, any tariff other
than zero reduces trade and thereby
reduces the gains that can be achieved
from trade. There are some textbook
cases in which a tariff can help one
country while hurting the other:  if, for
example, the country imposing the tariff
is large compared to the other country.
For simplicity, however, the arguments
are best understood by assuming that no
country is large enough to affect the
world price of the good.
■ Unfair Trade Practices
To encourage free trade, countries often
align themselves into trading areas, such
as the European Union (EU), the pro-
posed FTAA, and so on. Imposition of
tariffs by one country could evoke a
response by the larger trading blocs. For
example, the EU is the second-largest
economy in the world after the United
States. Press reports indicate that the EU
plans to retaliate against the steel tariffs
imposed by the United States. This sort
of retaliation can lead to what are known
as “tariff wars,” like those experienced in
the 1920s and 1930s that all but shut
down international trade.
The desire to avoid such mutually
destructive tariff wars led to the estab-
lishment of the GATT (General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade), which is now
called the WTO (World Trade Organiza-
tion). Member countries agree to abide
by a set of rules that are designed both 
to avoid tariff wars and to promote 
international trade more generally. There
are also specific provisions to aid devel-
oping countries.
One way WTO rules are intended to help
is by ensuring that competition between
countries is fair. As mentioned above,
freer trade will cause short-run disloca-
tions in an economy when products that
once were produced at home are now
purchased from abroad. Plants might
close, workers might lose their jobs, and
so on. WTO rules try to prevent countries
from gaining unfair advantages through
subsidies or tariffs.
The rules governing trade policy set out
by the WTO are indeed voluminous and
are only touched upon here, but the
examples give the reader a general idea
of the thrust of many trade pacts. The
WTO does not define unfair trade prac-
tices; that is up to member countries. The
WTO defines a number of concepts and
establishes a set of rules for member
countries to follow. Prior to imposing the
steel and softwood lumber tariffs, the
United States has to follow these rules, a
job conducted by the United States’Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC).
One of the complaints that often arises
is that of “dumping.” The WTO defines
dumping as selling in an export market
for less than in a domestic market.
Under WTO rules, dumping is not suffi-
cient for a country to impose an
antidumping tariff. The complaining
country must show that competing
domestic companies have experienced
real injury. The WTO also defines a
number of different types of subsidies,
only some of which are “actionable,”
that is, for which countervailing tariffs
may be imposed. Again, the complain-
ing country must demonstrate that com-
peting domestic firms have suffered
material harm.
All this seems only fair: Firms should
compete on a “level playing field.” If
foreign countries are giving their
exporters an advantage through subsi-
dies, it seems only right that the United
States should remove such an advantage
by imposing a tariff on those goods. In
the abstract, it seems so straightforward.
In practice, it is not so easy.
■ Steel
On December 19, 2001, the ITC, in
response to a complaint from the U.S.
steel industry, found that the imports of
certain specialty steel products had
increased in such quantities as to have
either caused substantial harm or the
threat of substantial harm to the U.S.
steel industry. On March 5 of this year,
President Bush proclaimed “safeguard”steel tariffs that affect, for the most part,
the EU, Russia, and Japan. The astute
reader will notice that these tariffs are
neither antidumping nor countervailing
tariffs. So-called safeguard tariffs are
permitted under WTO rules if, as found
by the ITC, the domestic industry has
been injured or is likely to be injured by
a surge in imports. The steel tariffs are
to last three years and will be phased
out over time—as required by WTO
rules. And here is where things can go
from bad to worse...
The EU has been extremely vocal in its
criticism of the U.S. steel tariffs. Under
WTO rules, the United States may be
required to compensate the Europeans,
among others, for the harm done by the
safeguard steel tariffs. WTO rules allow
the EU to impose immediate sanctions
on the United States if the tariffs are
deemed unjustified and if the United
States refuses to remove the tariffs or
pay compensation. The Europeans have
not yet imposed such sanctions. In their
statements to date, the Europeans have
been rather selective in their choice of
U.S. exports to target for retaliation:
a variety of U.S. steel exports, valued 
at $600 million, as well as goods pro-
duced in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia, the very states that stand to
gain the most from the U.S. steel tariffs.
The total value of goods on which the
EU might impose retaliatory tariffs is
over $2 billion. The Europeans are also
concerned about damage to their steel
industry as steel is diverted from the 
U.S. market to the European market.
But even if the Europeans “win,” they
“lose” in that the sanctions they are per-
mitted hurt Europe as much as they hurt
the United States. It is exactly this sort
of tit-for-tat tariff war that the WTO
was designed to avoid.
■ Softwood Lumber
Canada and the United States have
been at loggerheads over Canadian
lumber exports for over 80 years. The
most recent dispute dates back over 20
years and revolves around the price
paid by Canadian forestry companies
for the logs that they use. In the United
States, 95 percent of the land from
which timber is harvested is in private
hands, and the price paid for the right to
cut timber is set by auction. By way of
contrast, in Canada 94 percent of
forestry lands are owned by provincial
governments. Stumpage fees—the
price paid by forestry companies for the
trees that they cut down—are set by the
provincial governments. The U.S.
forestry industry claims that these
stumpage fees are set at artificially low
levels and so constitute an illegal sub-
sidy. The Canadian government’s
response is that stumpage fees represent
only part of the costs of extracting trees.
The forestry companies are responsible
for planning, road building, reforesta-
tion, and environmental protection.
The Canadian softwood lumber industry
points out that in three previous “bat-
tles” in the timber wars, it has yet to lose
a final decision regarding either dump-
ing or subsidization of the industry. At
times, the Canadians have agreed to var-
ious tariffs or quotas to avoid costly
delays and appeals. The most recent
agreement expired in 2001, leading to
the current battle.
Thousands of Canadian jobs are at
stake. In British Columbia alone, 15,000
forestry workers have been laid off. The
Canadian government is under great
pressure to provide support for the
Canadian softwood lumber industry.
Unfortunately, such support is likely to
be interpreted by the United States as—
you guessed it—an illegal subsidy.
■ Retaliation
WTO rules specify that member coun-
tries will not take unilateral action when
they feel that fellow member countries
have violated trade rules. Instead, mem-
ber countries agree to use a multilateral
system to resolve disputes.
Nonetheless, the timing of certain
actions can be suspicious. By way of
example, on March 25 the Canadian
government imposed provisional duties
of up to 71 percent on imports of fresh
U.S. tomatoes. This duty was imposed
by the Canadian Customs and Revenue
Agency as a result of a dumping com-
plaint filed in November 2001 by Cana-
dian tomato producers, who claim that
U.S. tomatoes are sold in Canada at
prices below what they sell for in the
United States.
As another example, Russia, hit by the
U.S. steel tariffs, recently lifted a
month-long embargo on U.S. poultry
exports. This embargo pushed down not
only poultry prices, but also those of
pork and beef, since all three compete
for cold storage space. While consumers
may enjoy these lower prices, poultry,
beef, and pig farmers have taken large
hits to their incomes. Russia, which
hopes to soon join the WTO, has not
explained why it imposed the embargo.
These two examples show how an
action by the United States—the steel
tariffs and the threat of softwood lum-
ber tariffs—may have repercussions for
other sectors of the U.S. economy.
■ Moving Forward
In the case of Canadian softwood lum-
ber, the United States has failed to 
sustain its claims of either improper
subsidies or dumping when the 
Canadians have filed appeals to inter-
national bodies like the WTO and
NAFTA arbitration panels. Many view
the U.S. demands for tariffs and quotas
on Canadian softwood lumber as
attempts to inhibit competition. Steve
Rogel, chairman and chief executive of
Weyerhaeuser, the world’s leading
lumber producer, said “The [Com-
merce Department] decision to impose
duties is based on deeply flawed trade
law and methodology designed to erect
protectionist barriers.” And while one
domestic industry may benefit from the
protection, others might suffer. The
proposed tariffs are expected to add
between $1,000 and $1,500 to the cost
of a new home. A group of U.S.-based
forest products companies and home
improvement companies, including
Home Depot and Lowe’s Home
Improvement Warehouse, have
launched an advertising campaign
encouraging the Canadian and U.S.
governments to come to a long-term
solution on the softwood lumber issue.
Perhaps the Canadian lumber industry
is right when it points out that it enjoys
a comparative advantage over its U.S.
counterpart; after all, land and trees are
plentiful and cheap in Canada. 
The steel industry’s problems date back
at least 20 years. It would be surprising
if Bush’s three-year tariff program suc-
ceeds in putting the industry to right
when Reagan’s four-year program did
not. Maybe the United States no longer
enjoys a comparative advantage in pro-
ducing steel products. In a recent col-
umn, George Will quotes Leo Gerard,
leader of the U.S. steelworkers union, as
saying that the U.S. Steel Corporation
has reduced the number of man hours
per ton from 10 in 1984 to 2.4 today. Yet,
U.S. workers are unable to compete with
Russian steel mills that pay their work-
ers $200 per week. (Mind you, that’s a
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Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned
from New Zealand. In 1984, its govern-
ment ended all farm subsidies. At the
time, subsidies accounted for more than
30 percent of the value of farm produc-
tion. By way of comparison, the U.S.
farm sector is currently subsidized at a
rate of 22 percent. There was no phase-
out period for the New Zealand agricul-
tural subsidies; instead, the government
offered one-time “exit grants” to those
who wished to leaving farming when the
subsidies ended. While the government
predicted that 10 percent of farms would
go out of business, in fact only 1 percent
did. Since the end of the subsidies,
increases in farm productivity have 
averaged 6 percent per annum compared
with 1 percent before the reform.
Eliminating tariffs or subsidies to cer-
tain industries certainly causes short-
term pain. For example, some U.S. steel
workers could lose their jobs and some
U.S. steel companies could go out of
business. Lumber companies may suffer
the same. But, as mentioned above, the
benefits from free trade can be redistrib-
uted in a way that can help those who
have suffered from the reallocation of
production. Indeed, the federal govern-
ment has programs, like Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance, to help such workers
by extending their unemployment insur-
ance benefits, paying for their retrain-
ing, and helping in their job searches.
Although many of the arguments sur-
rounding trade policy seem to revolve
around the protection of domestic jobs,
it is by no means clear that tariffs or
subsidies save jobs. And the obvious
costs of opening up to free trade—the
loss of specific jobs—must be weighed
against the benefits of freer trade—
lower prices and greater varieties of
products—that can be enjoyed by all
the citizenry.
As illustrated in the fish-and-chips exam-
ple, international trade is not about divid-
ing up a fixed pie, but rather making a
bigger pie. Americans have been part of
one of the greatest free trade areas the
world has ever known—it’s called the
United States of America. Why stop at
artificial international borders? 